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1961 ] RECENT DECISIONS 649 
TAXATION - INCOME TAX - GROSS INCOME FROM MINING AS THE BASIS 
FOR COMPUTING PERCENTAGE DEPLETION ALLOWANCES - Respondent, a miner 
of raw fire clay and a manufacturer of such clay into vitrified products, 
claimed a percentage depletion deduction based upon the gross income from 
the sale of its finished goods,1 contending that because its crude minerals 
l Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 114 (b) (4), entitled respondent to a percentage depletion 
allowance based upon "gross income from mining." "Mining" was defined to include "not 
merely the extraction of the ores or minerals from the ground but also the ordinary 
treatment processes normally applied by mine owners . • . to obtain the commercially 
marketable mineral product or products .... " Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 114 (b) (4), as 
amended, ch. 63, § 124, 58 Stat. 45 (1944) [carried forward into INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, 
§ 613 (c) (1), (2), which was, however, amended by 74 Stat. 292 (1960)]. It will be noted that 
the taxable year in question is 1951; hence, the case is governed by the 1939 code. 
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could not be sold profitably in a local market, these final products were 
the first to meet the statutory standard of "commercially marketable mineral 
product."2 The district court3 and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit4 accepted respondent's contention. On certiorari to the United States 
Supeme Court, held, reversed, one Justice concurring. The fact that a tax-
payer himself cannot sell his crude minerals at a profit does not make them 
commercially unmarketable within the meaning of the Code. United States 
v. Cannelton Sewer Pipe Co., 364 U.S. 76 (1960). 
One of the important questions in litigation seeking to define "commer-
cially marketable mineral product"5 has been whether a particular ta.xpay-
er's crude mineral is commercially marketable if he cannot sell it at a profit 
in a market which other producers use to make profitable sales of the same 
product. Lower federal courts have consistently held that it is not.6 The 
effect of these decisions has been to allow depletion deductions to be com-
puted by reference to the gross income from the sale of finished mineral 
products and thereby to increase the possibility of excessive depletion allow-
ances. In overruling this line of decisions, the Supreme Court resolved the 
interpretative problem facing it by reference to the pre-enactment legislative 
materials.7 On the basis of the implications of these congressional reports, 
it properly adopted an industry-wide test for determining commercial mar-
ketability: if a mineral is being sold on a profitable basis by other miners, 
it is commercially marketable, regardless of whether the particular ta.xpayer 
can market it at a profit. 
Although the acknowledged basis for adopting such a test was a proper 
technical interpretation of legislative intent, the industry-wide standard has 
the additional merit of producing a result that is more consonant with an 
economically acceptable theory of percentage depletion than the individual 
taxpayer approach it replaces. Although the depletion rates are admittedly 
arbitrary and the actual deductions bear no relation to the cost basis of a 
taxpayer's mineral, the most compelling economic justification for permit-
ting the depletion of non-strategic minerals is tax-free recovery for the 
2 On the other hand, the Government argued that the raw clay was "commercially 
marketable" and that the depletion allowance should be computed by reference to the 
constructive gross income from the hypothetical sales of the crude minerals. 
3 Cannelton Sewer Pipe Co. v. United States, 58-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9676 (S.D. Ind. 1958). 
4 Cannelton Sewer Pipe Co. v. United States, 268 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1959). 
5 See generally White & Brainerd, Percentage Depletion of Minerals- A Costly Study 
in Definitions, 34 TAXES 97 (1956); Hobbet & Donaldson, Percentage Depletion for Min-
erals, 37 TAXES 477 (1959). 
6 Riverton Lime & Stone Co., 28 T.C. 446 (1957); Sparta Ceramic Co. v. United States, 
168 F. Supp. 401 (N.D. Ohio 1958); Standard Clay Mfg. Co. v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 
590 (W.D. Pa. 1959); Cannelton Sewer Pipe Co. v. United States, 268 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 
1959). See also Commissioner v. Iowa Limestone Co., 269 F.2d 398 (8th Cir. 1959); Book-
walter v. Centropolis Crusher Co., 272 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1959). 
7 See S. REP. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24 (1944); Hearings on H.R. J687 Before 
Senate Committee on Finance, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 258 (1944); Hearings Before the 
Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives on Proposed Revisions of 
the Internal Revenue Code, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 1857 (1947); S. REP. No. 2375, 
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 53-54 (1951). 
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e.xhaustion of capital invested in mineral assets. Theoretically, then, the 
basis for computing the deduction should be related in some way to the 
mineral capital actually consumed. By precluding acceptance of the eco-
nomics of the individual taxpayer as the principal factor in determining 
commercial marketability, the industry-·wide test encourages a proper eco-
nomic focus on the mineral consumed rather than on the product ultimately 
marketed. 
A similar focus is achieved by a recent statutory amendment which makes 
fundamental changes in the definition of "mining."8 The effect of the 
amendment is to require all miners to base their depletion deductions on 
the income (actual or constructive) from the sales (real or hypothetical) 
of the product (marketable or unmarketable) created by the processes 
specifically enumerated in the Code.9 In framing this amendment Congress 
ignored completely the old standard which was interpreted by Cannelton 
and adopted a new approach to the problem of determining the bases for 
depletion allowances. Rather than be concerned with the time when a 
product is commercially marketable, Congress attempted to draw a specific 
line benveen the mining and manufacturing stages of production by listing 
the processes it thought to be a part of normal mining operations. In so 
doing, it eliminated the possibility of basing depletion deductions on gross 
income from the sale of finished products and, thus, embodied in the Code 
a more acceptable theoretical approach to the determination of the bases for 
the computation of depletion allowances. 
John Niehuss 
s Public Debt and Tax Rate Extension Act of 1960, § 302 (b), 74 Stat. 292 (1960), 
amends INT. R.Ev. ConE OF 1954, § 613 (c) (2) [formerly Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 114 (b) (4), 
as amended, ch. 63, § 124, 58 Stat. 45 (1944)] to read: " (2) MINING -The term 'mining' 
includes not merely the extraction of the ores or minerals from the ground but also the 
treatment processes considered as mining desaibed in paragraph (4) (and the treatment 
processes necessary or incidental thereto) .••• " Sec. 613 (c) (4) of the amended Code contains 
a specific enumeration of those treatment processes which, within various contexts, are to 
be considered "mining." For example, § 613 (c) (4) (G) provides that "in the case of clay ••• 
crushing, grinding, and separating the mineral from waste, but not including any subse• 
quent process" are included within "mining." 
9 Although the amendment will eliminate litigation with regard to when a particular 
product becomes commercially marketable, the following new sources of litigation appear 
to be created: valuation of the constructive income from the fictional sales of non-market-
able minerals; interpretation of "the treatment processes necessary or incidental thereto"; 
and inclusion of a particular process in "mining" even though not enumerated in the Code 
based on the fact that "the term 'mining' includes • • ." is used rather than "the term 
'mining' means •••• " 
